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BOOKS
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. By Raoul
Berger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 345. $14.95.
The founding fathers did not hastily adopt the impeachment provision'
of the Constitution. They were fully familiar with the way that the English
Parliament had utilized the impeachment process to curb the powers of the
monarchy and to establish parliamentary supremacy. And they deemed it
essential that the impeachment institution be available to the Congress as an
instrument for protecting both constitutional government and the people, in an
ultimate showdown, against gross abuse of power by the Chief Executive.
The basic English model was therefore incorporated into the Constitution,
with the House having the power to move impeachment by majority vote
and the Senate to try the issues and convict upon two-thirds vote.
In adapting the impeachment process to the American scene, however,
the framers inevitably left certain ambiguities in the final provisions. Some
of these arose out of the fact that the founding fathers did not wish to take
over the English practice lock, stock and barrel. Impeachment was intended
to be applicable only in a narrower set of circumstances and with more limited
results. Hence, after some preliminary discussion, the proposal was made
that the President could be removed from office by impeachment and convic-
tion "for treason, or bribery." This was deemed too restricted and, after re-
jecting "maladministration" as a cause for impeachment, on the ground it
was too broad, the Convention settled on the addition of "other high crimes
and misdemeanors." The grounds for impeachment were thus intended to
be limited but, apart from a narrow definition of treason elsewhere in the
Constitution,2 the limits were not precisely delineated.
A further ambiguity arose out of the fact that, at the last minute, the
Convention extended the impeachment clause to apply not only to the Pres-
ident but also to "the Vice President and all civil officers of the United
States." The principal effect of this extension has been to bring federal judges
under the impeachment provision. The removal of lower court judges and
minor executive officers, however, raises quite different kinds of problems
from the removal of the President, Vice President, or a top executive official.
This combination of functions in the impeachment provision has been a source
of considerable confusion in the understanding and application of its terms.
Actual operation of the impeachment process over the years has not
tended to resolve these and many other problems. There have been twelve
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
2. Id. art. III, § 3.
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cases of impeachment voted by the House, of which eleven went to trial in
the Senate and four resulted in convictions. Only the impeachment of Pres-
ident Andrew Johnson, and to some extent the impeachment of Supreme
Court Justice Samuel Chase, both of which ended in acquittals, have raised
broad issues affecting the fundamental balance of power in the government
such as the framers of the impeachment provisions originally had in mind.
Of the remaining cases, one involved a Senator and resulted in acquittal,
apparently on the ground that members of Congress were not "civil officers
of the United States" within the meaning of the impeachment provision;
one was directed at a cabinet officer, who resigned before trial, and was also
acquitted; and the other eight related to lower federal judges, mostly charged
with bribery, drunkenness, and similar forms of misconduct. It is in this last
category that all four convictions were obtained. In general, no coherent or
accepted body of law has grown out of these proceedings.
Raoul Berger's Impeachment: The Constitutional Issues is a valuable
contribution in this confused state of affairs. Without doubt it is the most
useful source of scholarly information on the law of impeachment now avail-
able. One cannot refrain from warning the non-legal reader, however, that
the book, like most legal writing, is so overloaded with footnote material as
to be virtually unreadable. It can be studied, but hardly enjoyed as literature.
The book was conceived, researched and written before the Watergate
disclosures brought into public discussion the possibility of impeaching a
President. Berger could hardly have foreseen how topical his subject would
become shortly after publication date. This accidental timing assures a certain
objectivity, views on impeachment tending to shift with political winds. Un-
fortunately, it also means that the book does not focus squarely upon many
of the specific issues that are now of crucial importance to the American
people. A large part deals with impeachment problems as they affect the lower
federal judiciary, where most of the action has occurred in the past. Never-
theless, the book does throw considerable light upon some questions of presi-
dential impeachment, and it is here that its major current interest is to be
found.
One of the most controversial of the present issues is the question of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Berger argues persuasively that im-
peachment is not limited to conduct that would constitute a crime or an in-
dictable offense. He points out that the term "high crimes and misdemeanors"
does not come from the criminal law-indeed was unknown to that law-but
derives from impeachment law itself. And he cites numerous cases where
conduct that did not constitute violation of law was made the ground for
impeachment (though conviction did not necessarily result). Among other
examples he finds the term "high crimes and misdemeanors" applied where
the accused "appropriated funds to purposes other than those specified";
[Vol. 74
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"procured offices for persons who were unfit and unworthy of them"; "allowed
the office of Ordnance to go unrepaired though money was appropriated for
that purpose"; and "thwarted Parliament's order to store arms and ammuni-
tion in storehouses." (Pp. 67-68.) The phrase "high crimes and misde-
meanors," he demonstrates, is not concerned with "high" in the sense of
"serious" crimes as such, but with misconduct by officials in high places who
are immune to ordinary forms of judicial or political control.
Berger also makes clear that an impeachable offense must be narrower
than the definition offered by Gerald Ford (then Congressman) in urging
the impeachment of Justice William 0. Douglas in 1970:
What, then, is an impeachable offense? The only honest answer
is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House
of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history;
conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the
other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of
the accused from office .... (P. 53.)
Quite the contrary, Berger notes, the framers expressly rejected the ground
of "maladministration" as being too broad and used the phrase "high crimes
and misdemeanors" as having a "limited" and "technical" meaning (pp. 86-
87).
Where then does Berger suggest that the line be drawn? On this he is
somewhat vague. He does clarify the situation somewhat by arguing (a
reversal of an earlier position) that the standards for impeachment of a
President, Vice President, or high executive official should be different than
that for a judge or (presumably) minor executive official. But he does not
go much beyond this. He simply states that impeachment lies only for "great
injuries," or "great misdemeanors" (p. 88), not for "petty misconduct."
(P. 90.) In the end the closest he gets to a definition is a standard of "great
offenses." (P. 92.)
One feels, however, that it is possible to do somewhat better on the basis
of Berger's materials. The crucial element in formulating standards for
impeachment of the Pf'esident or other high executive official is suggested
by language used in some of the English impeachments. In 1642, the Earl
of Strafford was impeached because, it was aleged, he had "undermined
the immemorial constitution of the kingdom by attacking its free institutions."
(P. 33.) And in 1680 the impeachment of Chief Justice Scroggs was based
on the charge that he had "wickedly endeavoured to subvert the fundamental
laws, and . . . to introduce . . . arbitrary and tyrannical government against
law." (P. 47.)
Surely it is this concept that the founding fathers intended to incorporate
in our Constitution. The President, Vice President or other high executive
officer is to be removed by impeachment when he engages in gross misconduct
1974]
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that undermines the basic principles of the constitutional order. Plainly the
conduct must go substantially beyond mere incorrect application of law, dis-
agreement on policy, or even action based upon a fairly arguable interpretation
of the Constitution. Nor would an isolated violation of a constitutional right
be sufficient. It would have to be misconduct so egregious as to subvert the
very ground rules of a democratic society.
Generally speaking, conduct of such a nature as to be impeachable under
this standard would fall into two broad categories. The first is usurpation
of power from one of the other branches of government. This would include
such matters as infringement upon the warmaking powers of Congress,
excessive use of executive privilege to withhold information from Congress
or the courts, impoundment of funds to a degree that thwarted the expressed
policies of Congress, and refusal to carry out decisions of Congress or the
courts, thereby failing in his obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." The second category embraces repeated and serious attacks upon
the constitutional rights of individual citizens, so patterned as to threaten
the system of individual rights under law. Creation of a special police force,
or the use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Central Intelligence
Agency, to engage in political surveillance or harassment by wiretapping,
burglary, forgery and the like-in other words, establishment of a secret
political police characteristic of a totalitarian dictatorship-would fall within
this category. In either case the impeachment power should be utilized only
in the face of conduct that destroys all claim to legitimacy.
Beyond questions of technical standards for impeachment lie difficult
political questions concerning the circumstances under which the remedy
of impeachment should be invoked. Everyone recognizes that impeachment
has a traumatic effect upon the body politic. If impeachment proceedings
are brought against the President, even though the bureaucracy may continue
to function much the same as before, the leadership operations of the executive
branch are seriously impaired. Public attention is concentrated upon an ele-
mental struggle for power rather than on the use of power to solve the nation's
problems. As Berger repeatedly points out, it is impossible to eliminate par-
tisan politics from an impeachment proceeding or to conduct such a contro-
versy wholly within the framework of pure principle. When should the
political leaders of a nation subject their country to such an ordeal?
Unfortunately Berger does not throw much light upon this question.
Our only actual experience with this sort of a problem is the impeachment
of Andrew Johnson. Although Berger has a long chapter on the Johnson
impeachment proceedings, he does not really elucidate the underlying issues.
Berger's view is the orthodox one. He starts with a predisposition to favor
Johnson's reconstruction position (pp. 260-61), and envisages the conflict as
one involving only a difference of policy between Johnson and his would-be
impeachers (pp. 261-62). He conceives the issue at stake to be whether the
[Vol. 74
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President is "impeachable for violating a statute [the Tenure of Office Act8 ]
S.. if in his judgment it invades his constitutional prerogatives." (P. 252.)
Counsel for the House managers are described as "buzzards" (p. 270), and
counsel for Johnson are called "as valiant a group of advocates as can be found
in the annals of the American bar . . . ." (P. 274.) The whole episode is
characterized as "a frightening reminder that in the hands of a passion-driven
Congress the process may bring down the very pillars of our constitutional
system" (p. 252), and a "gross abuse of the impeachment process .
(P. 295.)
It is certainly true that the precise grounds for impeachment alleged by
the House-violation of the Tenure of Office Act in dismissing Secretary of
War Stanton, and "intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues"
against Congress-were in themselves inadequate grounds for impeachment.
Likewise the trial itself was precipitous and in significant respects unfair.
Nevertheless, the impeachment proceedings cannot be regarded as merely
irresponsible efforts by passionate partisans to drive a hated President out of
office. The issues went far deeper and deserve to be studied more fully for
the light they throw upon the legitimate use of the impeachment power.
Another view of the situation is possible. The North had won the war,
at the cost of tremendous bloodshed and agony, and the question facing the
country was what kind of a reconstruction would take place. Although Con-
gress, the basic policy-maker under the Constitution, was divided, a clear
majority favored policies that would eliminate the power of the landholding
aristocracy that controlled the Southern States before the war, and give sub-
stantial support, by way of land, the vote and basic civil rights, to the former
slaves. Johnson, who sympathized with the old Southern regime, was Presi-
dent by accident of Lincoln's assassination. In essence, by use of his powers
as military chief and by disregard of congressional enactments, Johnson re-
fused to carry out the program of the legislative branch. Congressional leaders
were confronted with the fact that, though they had won the war, they were
losing the peace. President Johnson's actions could be viewed as a flagrant
violation of his constitutional obligations to enforce congressional policies,
which policies, not incidentally, concerned momentous issues that would effect
the life of the country for generations to come. Under the circumstances the
only available constitutional remedy would seem to have been impeachment.
Concededly the techniques used in invoking the impeachment power were
faulty, and this may well have been the reason that a conviction failed in the
Senate by one vote. Yet a strong case can be made for the proposition that
use of the impeachment institution was entirely justified and that the country
would have been better off in the end had it succeeded.4
3. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430.
4. The foremost proponent of this view is Professor Benedict of Ohio State Univer-
sity. See M. L. BENEDIcT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1973).
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Another issue that has been raised by recent events is the question
whether there is or should be any judicial review of the impeachment pro-
ceedings conducted by the legislature. The constitutional provisions that the
"House of Representatives shall . . . have the sole Power of Impeachment,"
and that the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,"
suggest that no review by the judicial branch was contemplated. Yet the issue
is by no means clear-the power to try does not necessarily exclude the power
to review a trial on appeal-and the question is certainly not foreclosed by the
language. Berger argues forcefully that judicial review should lie, though he
does not clearly explain the scope of review he would advocate. He rests his
case for review upon the basic premises of Marbury v. Madisonr-that the
Supreme Court is the agency of government given the ultimate power to inter-
pret the Constitution and apply the law-and relies heavily upon Powell v.
McCormack6 in which the Supreme Court allowed review over the action
of the House of Representatives in refusing Adam Clayton Powell his seat.
Berger's argument is in many ways persuasive but it suffers, I think,
from the failure to make a distinction between the impeachment of judges or
other minor civil officers, and the impeachment of the President. In the for-
mer situation the issues are likely to be of a narrowly factual nature and
readily reviewed by a judicial process, and the political forces are more willing
to accept the judicial judgment. Moreover, as to federal judges, there is argu-
ment for the position that the judicial branch should be able to protect its
independence against legislative interference by invoking the general practices
of judicial review.
Where the object of the impeachment is the President or Vice President,
however, there is grave doubt that judicial review is feasible. As to inter-
locutory review, the delay factor alone would seem to preclude review. As to
review after conviction by the Senate, it seems unlikely that intervention by
the courts would add to the justice of the outcome or the stability of the
nation. An impeachment proceeding-both in its substantive and procedural
aspects-is ultimately a political rather than a judicial process. Not that judi-
cial issues are not present or that judicial procedures are irrelevant. But
fundamentally the judgments made are more matters of statesmanship than
of the kind of law administered by the courts. Hence there is, as to most is-
sues, insufficient basis for a judicial body to act. More important, the courts
would almost certainly be overwhelmed by the political forces unleashed by
an impeachment proceeding. It is difficult to visualize the Supreme Court suc-
cessfully reversing the decision of a majority of the House and two-thirds of
the Senate that a President or Vice President should be removed from office.
If we cannot trust the political integrity of the members of the legislature in
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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utilizing the extreme sanction of impeachment, we are not likely to find sal-
vation in judicial action. One rather guesses the Supreme Court % ould itself
look on the matter in this light.
Another set of problems relate to questions of procedure in the impeach-
ment process. Here again Berger does not address himself to these issues.
Nor is adequate material available from other sources. It is possible to for-
mulate the outlines of the problem, but many details remain to be filled in.
Most observers tend to assume that the impeachment process should
adhere as strictly to judicial procedures as possible. This is a dubious starting
point. A judicial process involving 435 grand jurors and 100 judges is not
a workable model. We are dealing rather with a decision-making process that
must rest on debate and vote by a legislative body. Moreover, neither the
legislature nor the political system as a whole can afford interminable delay
in resolving the issues.
The need to develop a fair, non-judicial, procedure should not alarm us
unduly. There is no reason to believe that the judicial method of solving
problems is the only proper one. As the operation of legislative investigating
committees has begun to demonstrate, other forms of fact-finding proceedings
can be made just and workable.
Fortunately, procedural difficulties are minimized by the fact, already
noted, that the decision made is not a judicial one, like that in an ordinary
criminal trial, but in a broad sense a political one. Thus many of the most
troublesome issues of fact-finding, such as those involving the intent with
which an act was done, will seldom have to be faced. Likewise issues of per-
sonal responsibility for conduct, as distinct from political responsibility, will
normally not have to be determined. And much of the evidence will be readily
available in the form of public actions or documents. In short, the decision
to be made deals in the main with political, not personal, conduct.
The function of the House, of course, is to decide whether impeachment
charges are to be preferred and, if so, to formulate them in specific terms with
supporting evidence. Obviously the main burden of this task has to be en-
trusted to a committee, armed with the subpoena power. Much of the relevant
evidence will already be in the public domain, or previously will have been
brought to light by other legislative committees, and would need only to be
assembled and reduced to coherent shape. Surely no requirement exists that
the committee obtain such evidence by a de novo hearing process. Other is-
sues may need further development and here the committee may have to turn
to hearings. A major problem may be to deal with situations where there is
a refusal by the executive branch to produce material evidence. Resort to the
judicial process for compelling the production of testimony or documents may
well prove to be unacceptably time-consuming. The legislative contempt power
may be inadequate or may be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding before
19741
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the courts. Under these circumstances, the committee and later the House
may be forced, as a way out of the dilemma, to rely upon presumptions as to
the existence of certain facts where proof in the possession of the accused is
withheld.
Another important issue may be whether the House committee should
open its hearings to allow rebuttal or cross-examination by the accused or his
representatives. Surely there is no obligation on the committee to do so. Its
function is to charge, not to adjudicate. Yet there seems to be good reasons
under most circumstances for the committee to hear the other side of the case
if the accused elects to present it. Other issues relate to whether the hearings
should be open or closed. Normally there would seem to be little justification
for secret proceedings.
Trial before the Senate poses another set of problems. Undoubtedly most
of the evidence would have to be presented in written form, as copies of
documents or transcripts of testimony previously taken. In some instances,
direct testimony of witnesses hiight prove advisable. But ordinary rules of
evidence in the judicial process would surely not prevail. In general the basic
requirements of fairness would seem to be met if the accused has full oppor-
tunity to present rebuttal evidence and such opportunity for cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses as is necessary to develop the facts. For the latter
purpose, it might be necessary to call some witnesses whose testimony has
been submitted by the prosecution in transcript form. It should be noted again,
however, that at this point in the proceedings hotly contested issues of specific
fact would most likely be of peripheral relevance.
Finally, the ultimate question must be faced: is the impeachment process
a viable way of protecting the Constitution against a despotic executive? One
would like to think so. Watergate has forced us to confront a stark possibility
that we have not faced in modern times, but that the founding fathers were
able to visualize. The pressures of present-day society have consistently oper-
ated to increase the powers of the executive branch, and particularly the chief
executive. Such accretion of power is undoubtedly necessary and must be
accommodated. But we have begun to see at first hand the dangers of a
twentieth century George III. In such a situation the most effective and
appropriate course of action is to revive the institution of impeachment.
No one can ignore the manifest dangers lurking in the impeachment
process. There is no way of eliminating all elements of partisan politics, and
the process is open to serious abuse. It is not clear that we can make the
process work procedurally without unfairness on the one hand or paralyzing
delays on the other. There has been little opportunity to experiment with
impeachment proceedings, apart from judicial impeachments, or to build up
a body of precedent.
Yet there is good reason to believe that the dangers inherent in the
[Vol. 74
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institution of presidential impeachment are not likely to prove disastrous in
actual operation. After all it is the legislative branch that wields the power.
Modern legislatures have seldom been sufficiently of one mind, or sufficiently
coordinated (unless dominated by the executive), to pose the threat of gross
abuse of the impeachment power. Moreover, some checks have been built into
the institution. It takes a majority of one house to impeach and two-thirds
of another to convict. The possibility that a popularly elected Chief Executive
will not be able to muster half the House or one-third of the Senate against
an unwarranted effort to remove him seems remote. Thus unless we have lost
all political morality, in which case we are undone anyway, it appears most
unlikely that the impeachment process could be successfully employed except
in justified cases of dire emergency.
Rather the real dangers may lie in the opposite direction. The true cause
for concern may well be that, even in an extreme situation, the legislature
cannot mobilize itself to act with the directness and dispatch necessary to
make the impeachment process work. The absence of such capacity has been
characteristic of Congress in its recent struggles with encroaching executive
power. Like other potential legislative power, exercise of the impeachment
power requires a modicum of courage, responsibility and cohesion. Effectively
utilized, however, presidential impeachment provides a mode of rededication
to constitutional principles without violence.
THOMAS I. EMERSON
Lines Professor of Law
Yale Law School
THE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLICLY-AIDED HOUSING. Charles
S. Ascher, General Reporter. The Hague: International Institute of Adminis-
tration Sciences. 1971. Pp. 215 & Annex I-II. $8.0o.*
Open my ears to music; let
Me thrill with Spring's first flutes and drums-
But never let me dare forget
The bitter ballads of the slums.'
President Nixon's moratorium on new commitments of federal funds for
housing2 has given the poor more cause to sing "the bitter ballads of the
slums." It is now clear that the President would like to terminate the con-
ventional public housing program as well as other construction-oriented
* The Administration of Publicly-Aided Housing is distributed in the United States
and Canada by the National Association of Housing Officials, 2600 Virginia Avenue,
Washington, D.C. 20027.
1. L. Untermeyer, Prayer, quoted in R FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF PuUc
HousING 24 (1959).
2. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
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housing subsidies.3 But termination, modification or continuation of conven-
tional public housing will not diminish the need for information on the
administration of all types of government-aided housing. 4 First, the 700,000
units of public housing currently operative will have to be administered,
as will those projects approved prior to the moratorium and yet to be com-
pleted." Second, the due process revolution in public housing inevitably will
spread to all government subsidized housing.7 Finally, the administration of
admissions, occupancy and evictions are problems which affect all housing,
subsidized or not.8 Federal law has already intruded into the domain of the
private property owner 9 and a "quiet revolution" has generated increased
state and local regulation of land use.10 It would be consistent with these
developments for admissions, occupancy and eviction standards similar to
those extant in conventional public housing to be imposed upon private ren-
tals. 1
I. THE NATURE OF THE HAS REPORT
The Administration of Publicly-Aided Housing is a report of adminis-
trative procedures employed in public housing programs of fourteen coun-
tries. 12 The report, sponsored by the International Institute of Administrative
Sciences (hereinafter IIAS), is divided into two parts: Charles Ascher's
General Report, a descriptive analysis of the various programs, and Yves
Chapel's summary of national monographs. This summary is a condensation
3. Fried, Lynn Details Housing-Subsidy Plans, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1973, at 12,
col. 3.
4. See Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV.
L. Rxv. 880, 881 n.8 (1973).
5. Approximately 2,200 local housing authorities operate 700,000 units of federally
aided low-rent public housing. Hartman & Carr, Housing Authorities Reconsidercd, 35
J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 10, 11 (1969).
6. Construction of pre-moratorium approved housing is expected to continue until
June, 1974. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
7. Note, supra note 4.
8. Cf. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO.
L.J. 519 (1966) ; Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Survey of the Develop-
ing Law, 1969 DUE L.J. 401 (1969).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970), which prohibits private landlords from discriminating
on the basis of race in the sale and rental of housing.
10. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROLS
(1971).
11. Note, supra note 4.
12. They are: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Hungary,
Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Although the participating countries are diverse economically
and politically, each has an administrative network for the distribution of housing to
segments of its public. Africa and Asia are not represented in the HAS report. Ob-
viously, monographs from African and Asian countries would have given the report a
great deal of cosmetic appeal and substantive enrichment. Nonetheless, one of the weak-
nesses of the methodology of this study may well be its ambitious attempt to cover as
many countries as it did. Perhaps a more concerted effort to examine and compare cur-
rent procedures in a few countries, say five, carefully selected to represent diversity in
economic, social and political conditions, would have been more useful. A smaller universe
for examination may also have enabled Ascher to undertake direct observation of proce-
dures and to meet and interview administrators, tenants, and applicants for admission to
public housing.
[Vol. 74
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of the responses to a written questionnaire of national reporters who describe
the following aspects of government-aided housing: (1) the forms of state
involvement in the provision of housing; (2) admission to government hous-
ing; (3) occupancy; (4) eviction; (5) common administrative procedures;
(6) due process; and (7) general assessment of the practical effectiveness
of formal administrative procedures.
The HAS study of public housing is one volume of the HAS series of
Comparative Studies of Administrative Procedures and Processes. The series
deals with "the conflicts which frequently oppose the Administration, acting
on behalf of the general interest for which it is responsible, and the Citizen,
legitimately defending his private interests, and with the manner in which
such conflicts should be dealt with." (P. 1.) Such a concern would rarely
be voiced in a world in which government's sole function was to preserve
law and order. But where government assumes as well the task of promoting
the social and economic welfare of its people, the conflict between individual
liberty and government action is frequently felt. 13 Now that polemics over
the desirability of the welfare state have subsided and the need for state
involvement in the social and economic order recognized, it is quite appro-
priate for a distinguished colloquium of scholars to examine the impact of
administrative agencies upon the rights of individuals.
But the study is not an academic exercise for academia's sake. Rather,
it endeavors to assist administrators in promoting the general purposes of
public housing programs while protecting the rights of individuals. "The
purpose of our work," states Andr6 Heilbronner in his Preface, "is to help
the Administration to define a course of action, i.e., a procedure, such that
no greater harm than is strictly necessary should be caused to the interests of
the individual." (P. 2.)
The HAS survey was carefully designed to avoid dangers inherent in
sole reliance upon written questionnaires. National reporters were selected
from each of the participating countries. Ascher prepared a draft question-
naire, tested it in a preliminary survey, and then modified it. He supple-
mented this method by adding information gained by direct observation in
some countries. It is unfortunate, however, that Ascher was unable to travel
to all of the countries studied for the report would have benefited from
systematic visits to all the reporting countries for independent observation
and consultation.
II. GOALS OF PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAMS
Ascher opens his first chapter by stating that "no nation in the world
is fulfilling a goal of decent, sanitary housing for every family." (P. 9.) The
United States is certainly no exception to this observation. Although the
13. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 143, 153-56
(1958).
1974]
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National Housing Act of 1949 calls for "the realization as soon as feasible
of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family,"114 the administration of the urban renewal program has not been
quite so egalitarian. Projects have consumed an inordinate amount of time
between, approval, implementation and completion, and have been relatively
oblivious of the housing needs of the poor.'r Many people cynically believe
that only developers and administrators have benefited from federally funded
construction projects. One congressional committee concluded:
Instead of a grand assault on slums and blight as an integral part
of a campaign for a "decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment for every American family," urban renewal was and is too
often looked upon as a federally financed gimmick to provide rela-
tively cheap land for a miscellany of profitable or prestigious enter-
prises.""
One of the problems with seeking universal decent, sanitary housing is
that the goal itself is phrased in such loose and general verbiage that it
allows administrators too much room for invention. What is "a decent home?"
What is "a suitable living environment?" To many Americans, a decent
home is two baths, a two-car garage, modern electrical appliances, and a
swimming pool. A suitable living environment is rolling hills and four-acre
lots. Millions of the world's poor would not dare dream of such decency.
They reside in one-room shacks built of adobe and scrap in Latin America,
tin-can towns in Havana, tin and rag shanties in India, and in many countries,
including the United States, thousands sleep in the streets, stairways or any
place they can find space.' 7
Even if national governments agreed to seek actively "decent, sanitary
housing for every family," that pursuit, by its terms, ignores the needs of
homeless millions who are not members of family units. The poor single
individual may find shelter only on the skid rows of large cities. The experi-
ence of the United States is probably representative. A national skid row
survey here found a polyglot group of predominantly male individuals re-
siding in deteriorating or dilapidated hotels.18 Many of these individuals are
unemployed, many have been displaced from migrant farm labor by mechani-
zation. Yet as former farm workers, they are ineligible for unemployment
insurance; as single, able-bodied men, they are ineligible for welfare benefits;
as singles who lack "proper" identification and cooking facilities, they are
ineligible for the food stamps program; as singles who have not had the
14. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970); Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1970) & 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1970). Cf. The Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development Act, 5 U.S.C. § 624 (1966).
15. See Building the American City: Rep. of the Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 152-69 (1968).
16. Id. at 153.
17. 2 HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 45 (1972).
18. D. BOGUE, SKID Row IN AMERICAN CITIES (1963).
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same address for ninety days, they are ineligible for urban renewal relocation
assistance; and as able-bodied singles who are not elderly and are not for-
mally displaced, they are not eligible for public housing.'9
Thus, insofar as the United States is concerned, the goal of "decent,
sanitary housing for every family" does not enjoy the specificity and scope
necessary to serve as a meaningful guide. Instead of briefly asserting that
all countries have failed to achieve this broad goal, the HAS report should
have presented the more specific housing goals and objectives of each national
program. One cannot safely conclude from Ascher's brief statement that no
nation is fulfilling any goals of its housing programs, since these goals-e.g.,
revitalization of the credit industry, employment, slum clearance, and aes-
thetics-may well involve an array of political, social and economic objectives.
III. UNIVERSAL SHORTAGE, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
CONSTRUCTION-ORIENTED STRATEGIES
A two-sentence paragraph bearing the title "Universal Shortage" begins
the first chapter of the HAS report. Indeed, a shortage of decent shelter
cripples the lives of millions from New York and Rome to the dark corners
of Ahmedabad, Cawnpore and Nagpur.20 But the brevity of the paragraph
marks the complexity of the issue. Emphasis must be placed on the adjective
"decent," for whether a shortage of shelter alone is the problem is more
questionable.
This question is currently the subject of debate in the United States. If
shortage is the problem, production is obviously the solution. Some contend,
however, that the housing crisis in United States cities results from under-
maintenance of the existing supply rather than from shortage.2 1 Unlike cities
in the developing countries, large cities in the United States either stopped
growing or lost population during the decade of the sixties 2 2 New York
19. See Note, No Room for Singles: A Gap in the Housing Law, 80 YALE L.J. 395
(1970).
20. It has been estimated that before the end of this century between 1,100
million and 1,400 million new dwelling units must be constructed in the world.
Assuming a medium estimate of 1,250 million, an average annual output of more
than 40 million new dwellings is required; about 10 million in the more developed
areas and 30 million in the less developed areas.
2 HpMAN SETTLEMENTS 42 (1972); Problems and Priorities in Human Settlements,
United Nations, Rep. of the Secretary General, 25th Sess., General Assembly, A/8037
(1970).
21. See, e.g., I. LOWRY, HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LoW-INcoME URBAN FAMILIES:
A FRESH APPROACH (1971).
22. A large number of cities in the United States have ceased to grow; many are
losing population. Of the largest cities in the United States, 111 had a population
increase of 10 percent; 51 had a population increase of less than 10 percent; and 130
had a decrease in population, losing an aggregate of 2.25 million persons. See id. at 2;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Projections of the Number of Households and Families,
1967 to 1985," Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 394, June 6, 1968. This
phenomenon in the United States is certainly not typical. The rapid growth of cities in
developing countries is unprecedented.
A comparison of the urban population living in cities of 500,000 or more shows
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City's experience is typical. The population of New York City has not changed
significantly in size since 1950; yet it has changed radically in composition.
The steady out-migration of whites since 1955 has been balanced by an equally
steady in-migration of blacks and Puerto Ricans. In-migration and natural
reproduction have combined to increase the city's minority profile from 13
percent of the total population in 1950 to more than 30 percent in 1970.23
The change in composition has caused a concomitant change in the -ability of
tenants to pay rents high enough to keep pace with spiraling costs of opera-
t*ion and maintenance. The result, according to Ira Lowry, is that "[1]and-
lords, unable to earn a competitive rate of return on their investments, simply
disinvested by undermaintenance."
24
But financial problems are not confined to the private housing market;
in fact, a major financial crisis threatens the very survival of public housing
in the United States.25 The problem arises from the inability of local housing
authorities to pay maintenance and operating costs in the face of low rent
rolls and rampant inflation. Consequently, local housing authorities (LHAs)
have incurred large operating deficits. LHAs have responded to this crisis,
as have private landlords, by undermaintaining their dwellings or by assess-
ing higher rents. In Fletcher v. Housing Authority,26 an LHA was allowed
to exclude low income families from vacant public housing units because of
the severity of its financial problems. Undesirable as this result may be, it is
predictable given the fact that maintenance and operating costs are to be
paid from rents. The congressional limitation of rents to 25 percent of the
tenant's income produces a situation in which LHAs have to restrict admis-
sion to tenants whose incomes are high enough to support maintenance and
operating payments.21 Alternatively, LHAs could openly disobey the con-
gressional mandate and charge rents higher than 25 percent of income. In
Barber v. White,25 the New Haven Housing Authority adopted the latter
approach. When the tenants challenged assessments that exceeded one-
fourth of their income, the NHHA asserted that application of the 25
percent rent ceiling without federal reimbursement for the resulting deficit
that in 1920 the ratio was 20% in developing regions and 47% in the developed
ones, while in 1960 this ratio rose to 43% in the developing regions and to only
49% in the developed ones.
2 HuMAN SETLEMENTS 36 (1972).
23. LowRY, supra note 21, at 9.
24. Id.
25. See King, Cities Losing on Aid for Housing Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1972; at 17, cols. 2-3; The Public Housing Financial Crisis: Cause and Effect, NAHRO
Bulletin, Sept. 29, 1972.
26. Memorandum Opinion, Order and Judgment, Civ. Act. No. 7399-g (W.D. Ky.,
filed, March 9, 1973).
27. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213(a),
42 U.S.C. § 1402(l) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1402-(1) (Supp. I, 1971). Congress
authorized funds for the inevitable deficits; however, Congress has failed to, appropriate
enough funds for this purpose and the Department of Housing- and Urban Development
has not applied other available funds to this problem.
28. 351 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Conn. 1972).
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constituted a taking of property without just compensation or due process
of law. Although the court rejected this argument, the court's response is a
shocking reminder of public housing's plight. Judge Newman stated:
The unappealing but blunt fact is that nothing in the Act nor any
judgment of this Court enforcing the Act requires the NHHA to
continue in operation. Of course there would be a serious frustration
of Congressional policy and a devastating impact upon innocent fam-
ilies if a housing authority were forced to close for lack of funds.
But if such a disastrous result should occur, the responsibility lies
with the Executive and Legislative Branches of the federal govern-
ment.
29
The financial crisis, accentuated by the general state of alarm over the
impoundment of funds appropriated for housing subsidy programs,30 has sent
policy makers back to the drafting tables to consider alternative approaches.
Yet quickly drawn new proposals would probably add only slight variations
to existing themes. If new strategies for government involvement in the
provision of shelter must be devised, then there should be a necessary period
of reevaluation to leave some time for a comparison of experiences in this
country with experiences in others.3 1 Shelter is, after all, a universal human
need.
Unfortunately, the IIAS study did not provide information on the extent
and degree to which finance affects administrative decisions. While this study
was designed to focus solely on questions of process rather than fiscal and
social problems, fiscal ability often affects the process that an agency dis-
penses. A local housing authority burdened with a tremendous deficit is likely
to adopt a tougher eviction policy and afford less due process than one that
is financially secure. An admission policy that had been based on need or
first-come-first-served may change to rigorous credit and character examina-
tions.
Given the severe financial problems caused by low rents and high main-
tenance and operating costs, the HAS report questions whether construction
of new buildings-the approach adopted by most nations-is in fact feasible.
Some economists have proposed that a rent certificate program designed to
enable low-income families to afford well-maintained older housing be sub-
stituted for programs based on the construction of new housing;32 various
29. Id. at 1096.
30. See Housing Authority of San Francisco v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Calif.
1972) where the court dismissed an action in which the LHA in San Francisco sought
release of one hundred and fifty million dollars appropriated for housing subsidy pro-
grams. Cf. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Lynn, Civ. Act. No. 990-73 (D.D.C. filed
July 23, 1973).
31. See D. MANDELKER, HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
(1973) for a comparative analysis of housing subsidy systems. Exchanges between
universities and agencies and grants for study in foreign countries may help law pro-
fessors gather first-hand information on foreign subsidy systems.
32. See LowRY, mtpra note 21, at 26-31.
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proposed incentives would encourage local governments to enforce local hous-
ing codes. An obvious danger of such a program is that it would reduce the
construction of new units for the poor in central cities. Barriers erected by
exclusionary zoning ordinances already often effectively bar such building
programs from the suburbs. Thus, the bifurcation between poor and rich in
city and suburb now maintained by exclusionary land use devices may be
exacerbated. In any case, few countries have the requisite housing stock to
consider the efficacy of a cash certificate approach to provide shelter for
low-income persons. Only Sweden, the Netherlands, West Germany, Great
Britain and France are thought to have a sufficient superabundance of older
housing.3
A subsidy systems analysis would have given readers an opportunity to
compare the subsidy approach and the conventional public housing approach.
Increasingly, researchers are concluding that, standing alone, public construc-
tion and rehabilitation of housing is insufficient. 34 Indeed, if the government
merely constructs housing and offers it for sale without subsidy, the poor
would be unable to afford public housing as well as privately-produced hous-
ing. The "subsidy gap" between the cost of housing and the ability of the
poor to afford it is not closed by the mere fact of government construction.
The HAS report might also have profitably included information on the
full circle of government involvement in housing. For example, the report
limited its discussion of the forms of state action to the participation of na-
tional governments, provincial or state governments, and municipalities in
the construction of public housing units for rent. No question was raised,
however, about other forms of government action, such as the construction
of ownership housing as opposed to rental housing and other direct and in-
direct subsidies. One can only guess at the kind of information that would
have been conveyed if the reporters had undertaken a deeper search. That
the information is there is clear. For instance, the national reporter for Spain
advised the IIAS:
There is a great variety of housing agencies whose legal status dif-
fers .... [T]hough there are municipal housing agencies, they are
33. Moskof, Foreign Housing Subsidy Systems: Alternative Approaches, Papers
Submitted to Subcommittee on Housing Panels on Housing Production, Housing
Demand, and Developing a Suitable Living Environment, pt. 2, at 627, Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, H. Rep., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
34. E. OLSEN, CAN PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION INCREASE THE QUANTITY OF HOUSING
SERVICE CONSUMED BY LOW-INcOME FAMILIES? at 1 (1969). Olsen states that:
the most rigorously developed and thoroughly tested theory of the housing
market implies that public construction and rehabilitation have no effect on the
long run equilibrium quantity of housing service. This theory makes clear that
it is the subsidy which accompanies public construction and rehabilitation that
results in greater consumption of housing service. The subsidy without direct
public construction or rehabilitation will result in greater consumption of housing
service. Public construction and rehabilitation without the subsidy will not result
in greater consumption of housing service.
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not so important ... as in many other countries. Besides, the ques-
tion is limited to housing for rent or lease, while, in spite of the
government's efforts, most public housing in Spain is built for sale.
(P. 85.) (Emphasis added.)
IV. ADmINISTRATION AND DuE PROCESS
The full panoply of administrative problems was not canvassed by the
HAS reporters. One wonders, for example, whether there were disparities
within the countries surveyed between the economic and social status of the
housing administrators and their tenants. A recent study of public housing
authorities in the United States found that the background of public housing
commissioners and public housing tenants differed substantially.
[Twenty-six] percent of all public housing families lack a male head
of household, yet few women serve as housing authority commis-
sioners. Over 55 percent of all households in public housing are non-
white-a proportion which is steadily increasing-yet only six percent
of the commissioners are nonwhite. Only 11 percent of public hous-
ing commissioners have incomes anywhere near the public housing
range (and most of these have incomes so low only because they are
retired): the median annual income in public housing nationally is
$3,132 for nonelderly households and $1,468 for elderly households
compared with $11,700 for the commissioners.3 5
This study raises some difficult questions. Should public housing policy
be made by persons who are on economic and social parity with public hous-
ing tenants? If so, what procedures should be established to provide for
tenant representatives to serve on local boards? The present practice in the
United States would not satisfy the goal of tenant representation, since mu-
nicipal mayors and county commissioners appoint persons to the city or
county boards.
While efforts should be made to provide tenants and their representatives
with access to the decision-making process, are public housing tenants the
only persons who have a stake in public housing? What about representation
for those low-income families who are eligible for public housing but who
have not received dwellings due to inadequate supply? If representation on
the policy-making board is limited to tenants, then the interests of eligible
non-tenants may not be protected. What about representation for residents
of those sections of the municipality where public housing projects are lo-
cated? Do they have a stake in the administration of admissions to and
eviction from public housing projects located in their neighborhoods? What
about those tenants who live in sections of town that are potential sites for
public housing projects? Should they be represented on the policy-making
board? Obviously, the problem is access to and participation in the decision-
35. Hartman & Carr, supra note 5, at 11-12. For a criticism of this study, see Cohen,
Comment on "Housing Authorities Reconsidered," 35 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 432 (1969)
Hartman & Carr's rejoinder appears at 35 J. Am. INST. PLANNEns 434 (1969).
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making process as opposed to actual representation on the commission. A
fair procedure for electing representatives to local boards would be a partial
though imperfect response to the problem of representation, and access to
meetings and hearings would be a method for asserting community interests.
Nevertheless, popular vote on public housing matters may serve as an
effective barrier to the implementation of public housing projects. In James
v. Valtierra,3 6 for example, the Supreme Court upheld Article 34 of the
California Constitution which provided that no low-rent housing project
should be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by a state public
body until the project was approved by a majority of those voting at a com-
munity election. The difficulty was that the poor, invariably a minority of those
voting, almost always lost in their efforts to obtain public housing.'7 Yet
Mr. Justice Black, writing for a 5-3 majority, stated:
The people of California have also decided by their own vote to re-
quire referendum approval of low-rent housing projects. This pro-
cedure ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice
in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local govern-
mental funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues.
It gives them a voice in decisions that will affect the future develop-
ment of their own community. This procedure for democratic deci-
sion making does not violate the constitutional command that no
State shall deny to any person "the equal protection of the laws. ' 38
Such decisions have forced civil rights organizations to begin seeking alterna-
tives to integration strategies. One such alternative is the improvement of
the environment of the ghetto by equalizing municipal services and by im-
proving the quality and quantity of maintenance services in ghetto neighbor-
hoods. Precedents developed in the administration of public housing-such
as rules on admission occupancy, and eviction-could play an important part
in the success of ghetto enrichment strategies.3 9
The HAS reporters capture and record the myriad procedures employed
by governments in the administration of public housing. Their object was to
report the alternative procedures rather than to evaluate them. Spotlighting
process in agencies that distribute government largesse is essential if we are
to solve the inefficiency that often belies administrative agencies and to un-
derstand the dynamics of distributing largesse.
Ascher's summary of admissions criteria is a brief but comprehensive
encyclopedia, including income, size of family in relation to size of dwelling,
housing conditions, reference to public agencies, social factors, moral recti-
36. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
37. Statistics on the impact of Article 34 are presented in Note, California's Low-
Income Housing Referendum: Equal Protection and the Problem of Economic Dis-
crimination, 8 COLUM. J. LAw & Soc. PRoB. 135, 140 (1972).
38. 402 U.S. at 142-43.
39. Colon v. Tompldns Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Note, supra note 4.
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tude, residence, "tied" housing, and discrimination. The HAS reporters also
provide data on the tenor of priorities for admission to public housing as
well as the procedures employed in establishing priorities. Accordingly,
Ascher reports that the following standards are used to establish priorities:
displacement, disabled veterans, chronological order of application (some
countries publish waiting lists), and gravity of need. The report reveals a
wide disparity in the standards and procedures employed by housing au-
thorities in the reporting countries. In Portugal, for example, an applicant
for public housing must be the "head of a family and not over 45 years of
age." (P. 95.) Hungary excludes from public housing any person who "has
been banished from a town or area." (P. 93.) And in Yugoslavia, "applicants
for admission must be working people of the corresponding organization,
working community or interest community." (P. 100.)
The HAS survey also reveals that many of the problems encountered
in the administration of public housing programs in this country have been
encountered elsewhere as well. For example, most of the countries surveyed
have general legislation that fails to define in clear and definite terms who
is and is not eligible for public housing and instead delegates the authority to
prescribe admission criteria to local administrative agencies (p. 18). With-
out more specific direction, local agencies have imposed admissions require-
ments that often exclude those persons most in need of government assistance.
In the United Kingdom, "unmarried mothers, cohabitees, dirty families and
transients" are excluded (p. 24). Under such a policy, a mother could be
denied admission to public housing because she "smelled bad," or was other-
wise obnoxious to the local administrator. Until recently, similar policies
were promulgated by some local housing authorities in the United States.40
In 1969, however, the Department of Housing and Urban Development is-
sued a circular that banned
the establishment of policies by the local housing authority for the
"automatic" denial of admission or eviction "to a particular class,
such as unmarried mothers, families having one or more children
born out of wedlock, families having police records or poor paying
habits, etc." 41
(P. 24.) Governments too often appear more concerned with the morality than
the needs of individual tenants. Exclusion for the reason that tenants are ob-
noxious to administrators or have different life styles may exacerbate the
social problems that public housing should alleviate.
40. See Rosen, Tenant's Rights in Public Housing, in Housing for the Poor: Rights
and Remedies 154 (N.Y.U. School of Law Project of Social Welfare, Supp. I, 1967);
Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Survey of the Developing Law, supra,
note 8; Note, Public Housing, 22 VAND. L. REv. 875 (1969); Note, Nonfinanwial
Eligibility and Eviction Standards in Public Housing-The Problem Family in the
Great Society, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1122 (1968).
41. U.S. DEP'T HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, LOW-RENT MANAGEMENT
MANUAL (1968).
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One advantage of the HAS report is that it includes data on tenant
organizations. In Belgium, we learn, membership in a tenant cooperative
association is a prerequisite for admission to government-sponsored housing
(p. 90). Perhaps such a procedure would be useful in the United States.
Since 1963, tenant unions in the United States have had a telling impact
on landlord-tenant relations. 42 Organized rent strikes, like labor strikes, have
produced collective bargaining agreements that have attempted to balance
power between tenants and landlord. These agreements define tenants' rights,
establish programs to train tenants in property management, prescribe griev-
ance procedures, and oblige landlords to recognize tenant unions as bargain-
ing agents of the tenants in all matters. Tenant unions have also begun to
exercise authority in the delicate area of admission. In Michigan, for example,
local public housing projects are managed by a board of tenant affairs, which
has the power to review and veto rules of local housing authorities, including
eligibility requirements for admission.
43 "
The HAS reporters did not examine the Belgium experience in admin-
istering such a program. Nonetheless, reporting the program alone should
inspire policy makers and administrators to reevaluate the role of tenant
unions in the governance of multiple dwelling units. The applicability of the
labor union model to property transactions should be given thought. While
it may appear that collective bargaining deprives the individual tenant and
landlord of the freedom to bargain for terms and conditions of the tenancy,
most poor tenants, at least, never enjoyed such a freedom if they ever had
it. Absentee slumlords used contracts of adhesion to keep the pendulum of
power swung to their side. But is the situation improved by shifting one
contract of adhesion for another? A closed shop would require tenants to
join a tenant association in order to obtain needed shelter. Such a condition
on the admission of tenants to public housing may be contrary to the purposes
of the public housing program, and may be unconstitutional as well.
44
The HAS reporters are at their best in describing the administrative
procedures employed by the various governments, and this effort is both
summarized and supplemented by Charles Ascher's general report. Ascher
describes, with careful elaboration, the organs for administrative hearing
and presents valuable information on the conduct of hearings, the procedural
42. T. FLAum & E. SALZMAN, URBAN RESEACH CORPORATION REPORT: THE TENANT'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1969).
43. Note, Tenant Unions Growth of a Vehicle for Change in Low-Income Housing,
3 U. CAL. DAvIs L. REv. 1 (1971).
44. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966). Tenant unions may provide some solutions to many of the
social problems which now plague multiple dwelling units. Peer pressures and cooperative
ventures may improve the care and maintenance of the dwellings, protect tenants from
consumer pitfalls by organizing buyers clubs, provide a source of emotional strength by
minimizing fear, suspicion and mistrust among tenants, and give each tenant a role in
the making of decisions that affect the quality of the environment.
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requirements of administrative hearings, judicial review and the ombudsman.
In the United States, a due process revolution has imposed constraints
on the dispensation of government benefits. The revolution commenced in
1970 when the Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly45 that due process
requires a hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits. The Goldberg
decision has been expanded to cover public housing.46 Courts have required
notice and hearing prior to denial of applications for admission,47 rent in-
creases 48 and evictions. 49 The proliferation of due process requirements in
the public housing arena has forced their adoption in the area of subsidized
housing as well.50 If the federal government adopts the housing allowance
approach, the need for all housing to be governed by due process standards
for admission, occupancy and evictions will be even more compelling. The
increase in landlords who operate housing units for recipients of federal sub-
sidies will enhance the need for adequate uniform standards for tenants'
rights. The experience gleaned from due process precedents in public hous-
ing will thus be vital to the efficient administration of all government housing
subsidies.
Administrators, practitioners, teachers and students whose interests lie
in housing will welcome the HAS report. Although it does not contain
enough information on any one program to offer workable blueprints for
materially altering operating programs, the discussion of various procedures
employed may generate new ideas about program administration.
Academicians hold a particular responsibility for the failure to devise
appropriate responses to provide the basic necessities of life to all humans;
they should singularly applaud the HAS for this study. First, it provides
scholars with a substantial base for developing a comparative analysis of
human settlements and the problem of government response to the universal
shortage of adequate shelter. Courses on housing are characteristically pro-
vincial and ethnocentric. Rarely do they include the problems and approaches
of other countries. Yet, land use and the need for shelter are problems that
extend from pole to pole. The HAS housing report could serve as the launch-
ing pad for a globally-oriented course on human shelter. Perhaps, the devel-
opment of such courses in universities around the world will elicit new ideas
and approaches; perhaps these ideas will lead to a sane approach to the
45. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
46. Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
47. Neddo v. Housing Authority, 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Davis v.
Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970) ; Sumpter
v. White Plains Housing Authority, 29 N.Y.2d 420, 278 N.E.2d 892, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649,
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928 (1972).
48. Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1202
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). But cf. McKinney v. Washington, 442 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
49. Note 58 supra.
50. Note, supra note 4, at 894-913.
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provision of shelter and to the development of human settlements. Second,
the report provides the opportunity to inspect the operations of administra-
tive agencies that dispense government largesse. Too often administrative
agencies are studied by an examination of the judicial review of agency ac-
tion or inaction. Consequently, the science of administrative practice remains
undeveloped. Too little is known about administrative agencies, particularly
non-regulatory agencies. The HAS study illuminates this dark corner so that
others may find the switch to turn on the light.
KELLIS E. PARKER
Associate Professor of Law
Columbia University School of Law
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER. By Marvin E.
Frankel. New York: Hill and Wang, 1972. Pp. x, 124. $5.95.
"Anyone can try a criminal case," said Mr. Justice McCardie. "The real
problem arises when the judge has to decide what punishment to award."u
Different judges' individualized, subjective solutions to the difficult problem
of sentencing criminals based upon their personal attitudes toward penology
and politics have created a highly criticized disparity in sentencing.2 In
Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order,3 Federal District Judge Marvin
E. Frankel directly confronts the basic problems inherent in our sentencing
system. Judge Frankel believes that no matter how conscientiously a judge
performs his duties, "the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we
give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable
for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." (P. 5.)
Since the judge performs the most readily visible role in the sentencing
process, he is the first to be criticized when the system falls into disarray.
Conceding the fallibility of judges as human beings, Judge Frankel views
the problem from a larger perspective. The sentencing process is necessarily
arbitrary because irrational penalty provisions prescribed by legislatures,
4
1. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1291 (1952), quating A. GOODHART, ENGLISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PHILOSOPIY OF
LAW 14 (1949) (statement of Mr. Justice McCardie).
2. See, e.g., Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge,
40 F.R.D. 55 (1966); Note, Criminal Sentence Revision-A Necessity, 49 IowA L.
REv. 499 (1964).
3. Judge Frankel's book is an elaboration of his contribution to the 1971 Marx lec-
tures at the University of Cincinnati Law School. See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentenc-
ing, 41 U. GIN. L. REv. 1 (1972).
4. That statutes in virtually every jurisdiction either provide no sentencing guidance
or manifest an incoherent penalty structure has been recognized in the literature. See,
e.g., Alexander, A Hopeful View of the Sentencing Process, 3 Am. CiuM. L.Q. 189
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coupled with the absence of recognized legal standards for sentencing, invite,
if not compel, arbitrariness. Yet although the legal profession is trained in
remedying defects of this nature, it has by and large ignored sentencing
problems. As Judge Frankel notes, "The problem has been too little law,
not too much." (P. 58,) In pursuit of rationality in sentencing, Judge
Frankel devotes the bulk of his thin volume to a survey of existing and
potential methods for remedying abuses in the sentencing process.
While the word "thin" describes the physical dimensions of the book,
it by no means indicates the magnitude and pervasiveness of the ideas that
are set forth. Significant of itself is the fact that a noted federal judge has
recognized monumental difficulties in a task he performs as a matter of
daily routine. Of larger importance, however, is the commendable attempt
he makes to canvass the "palliatives, remedies, and directions of hope" in
an area that has not been treated in a manner commensurate with its overall
importance to the administration of criminal justice.
The first step towards rectification of the sentencing process must be
undertaken by judges themselves. On that score, Judge Frankel explores
several existing ideas for judicial self-improvement. One idea, the sentencing
institute, was statutorily designed to promote uniformity in sentencing
by formulating, with the combined wisdom of judges, attorneys and experts
in penology, uniform policies and objectives for sentencing in federal cases.5
Notwithstanding these benevolent ideals, however, in practice sentencing
institutes have developed into a forum for advocating set ideas rather than
interchanging new ones. In no small part this is due to the fact that "an
absence of adequate law" precludes the meaningful discussion of sentencing
guidelines and forces the institutes to "function in a vacuum." (P. 67.) Never-
theless, while Judge Frankel does not view the institutes as a panacea for
judicial self-improvement, he concludes that they should be maintained and
developed as an adjunct to more penetrating changes.
The suggested penetrating changes in the sentencing process are limita-
tions on the trial judge's exercise of broad discretion. Implicit within our
constitutional system of checks and balances is the notion underlying Lord
Acton's dictum that power tends to corrupt.6 Discretion is not, of course,
tantamount to tyranny. But Judge Frankel believes that sentencing discretion
should be exercised within the structure of concrete legal standards. Thus,
(1965) ; cf. Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 465, 483 (1961).
5. 2& U.S.C. § 334 (1970). See generally Youngdahl, Development and Accomplish-
ments of Sentencing Institutes in the Federal Judicial System, 45 NEB. I. REv. 513
(1966).
6. But cf. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 335 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("To whatever extent history may confirm Lord Acton's dictum that power tends to
corrupt, such a doctrine of fear can hardly serve as a test, under the Due Process
Clause....!).
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he proposes checks on the sweeping power by compulsory use of sentencing
councils and appellate review of sentences.
7
As constituted, sentencing councils are generally composed of the sen-
tencing judge and two of his brethren. The council members meet with the
probation officer to review the presentence report and share their individual
views on the appropriate sentence. While the advice is not binding upon
the sentencing judge, the opportunity to reflect upon a consensus view tends
to reduce disparity in the sentences actually imposed. But the councils have
not become engrained upon the fabric of our criminal procedure.8 Their
failure to take hold results from the traditional concern with the preserva-
tion of judicial resources and independence, plus the fear of procedural ir-
regularity stemming from the influence upon sentences exerted by judges
whom the defendant has not personally confronted. Judge Frankel, believing
"that the sentencing council is superior to the orthodox technique of decision
by a single judge" (p. 71), squarely challenges these arguments.
First, when compared to the hours consumed with minutiae resulting in
civil damages, the additional time invested in sentencing councils is a trivial
concern. On balance, it is wiser to increase the number of judges if necessary
than to create legal doctrines that inhibit the effectiveness of the existing
judiciary. Second, even if judicial independence is a valuable adjunct of
sentencing,9 the councils do not overly impinge upon that independence be-
cause the sentencing judge remains free to ignore the opinions of his brothers
on the council. Finally, assuming that an exchange of views has a beneficial
impact on sentencing, it is a legal fiction to hold, as a policy matter, that
sentencing councils are prejudicial to a defendant. 10
7. As a third means for limiting trial judges, Judge Frankel recalls, without ex-
tended discussion, the old idea of mixed sentencing tribunals. That concept, suggesting
that sentences be imposed by a panel composed of a judge, psychiatrist and sociologist,
has not been seriously advanced for forty years. See S. GLUECx, CRIME AND JUSTICE
225-26 (1936). Perhaps the total rejection of this idea is due to the fact that some
judges view themselves as both psychiatrists and sociologists, while others totally dis-
trust members of both professions.
8. The practice is in effect in only three federal jurisdictions. See Levin, Toward
a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L. REv. 499 (1966) (Eastern District
of Michigan) ; Parsons, Aids in Sentencing, 35 F.R.D. 423 (1964) (Northern District of
Illinois) ; Zavatt, Sentencing Procedure in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, 41 F.R.D. 469 (1966); Zavatt, Sentencing Procedure
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 54 F.R.D.
327 (1968).
9. Judge Frankel firmly believes that the concept of "judicial independence" is no
more than a euphemistic acceptance of sentences that reflect "the frightening chanciness
of judicial tejnpers and reactions." (P. 19.) Consequently, one of his major theses in-
volves the restriction of a judge's power to impose sentences on the subjective basis
of his personal values.
10. In United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd after remand, 479
F2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit, citing Judge Frankel's views, rejected a
challenge to the denial of a motion for reduction of sentence without first submitting
newly discovered data to the sentencing panel assigned to the case. More than tacitly
approving of sentencing councils on principle, the court said:
[W]e regard the operation of the sentencing panel as a sensible and imaginative
approach to the problems of sentencing in the district court, and we would be
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While these answers to the various objections raised by the opponents
of sentencing councils are, perhaps, somewhat oversimplified and facile, cor-
relation of the factors relied upon by individual judges before determining
an appropriate sentence is clearly both a valuable educational tool and a mech-
anism for reducing disparity. Recognizing the law of inertia, however, the
probability of attaining these advancements is slim unless sentencing councils
are legally required. And this is precisely Judge Frankel's point: "The deci-
sion on whether to use sentencing councils ought to be a matter of law,
applicable alike to all objectively similar situations." (P. 73.)"'
Even if legally compelled, sentencing councils provide no more than a
forum for the exchange of nonbinding views by fellow trial judges. Because
the sentencing judge remains free to reject outright any mediating influences,
the check on sweeping discretion, although existent, is substantively minimal.
Thus, Judge Frankel recommends that appellate courts review the propriety
of criminal sentences.
The Supreme Court recently enunciated the general rule that "a sen-
tence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is gen-
erally not subject to review."'12 A rare exception is recognized where the trial
judge relies upon-and articulates-a forbidden ground for increasing a sen-
tence.13 But even then, the appellate court does not reduce the sentence, but
remands for reconsideration. 1 4 Judge Frankel asserts that "our rule of non-
appealability of sentences is maintained at some uncertain cost in hypocrisy
and evasion." (P. 81.) 15 Consequently, he urges that appellate review be made
available both to combat capriciousness in the sentencing process and to gen-
reluctant at this time to encumber this informal process with mandatory proce-
dures.
470 F2d at 289.
11. While the American Bar Association subscribes to the same view on the de-
sirability of sentencing councils, its standards are couched in the permissive term "de-
sirable" and, therefore, fail to serve as a clear cut mandate. See ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 7.1 (Approved Draft 1968).
12. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1973) (dictum). See also United
States v. McCord, 466 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764
(4th Cir. 1964); cf. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences of Appeal, 37 CoLUM. L.
REv. 521, 522 (1937). Contempt cases are exempted from the operation of the rule
because of the unique sensitivity toward abuse of the contempt power. Yates v. United
States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958) ; United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1110 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1973) (prior convictions se-
cured in the absence of counsel) ; Scott v. United States, 419 F2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(post-conviction refusal to admit crime); United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th
Cir. 1960) (standing policy to impose greater sentences after trial on the merits than
after guilty plea).
14. But see United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972) (appellate
court reduced sentence where district judge failed to do so upon two prior remands for
reconsideration).
15. Some emasculation of the rule has emerged in selective service cases where appel-
late courts are reducing sentences when trial judges; as a policy matter, impose substantial
uniform sentences upon defendants who claim to be conscientious objectors. See, e.g.,
Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v.
Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 625
(7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Fairchild, J., concurring). But see United States v. McCord,
466 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972).
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erate a body of law governing the practice.' 6 Nevertheless, although appellate
review of possible abuses of sentencing discretion appears superficially plau-
sible in theory, a number of practical impediments exist.
Appellate courts are generally reluctant to interfere with decisions of
trial judges in areas in which the law recognizes a wide breadth of discretion.
The appellate litany is that discretion must be exercised within a defined set
of legal perimeters; where a trial judge fails to heed the applicable legal prin-
ciples governing his exercise of discretion, the exercise is viewed as a re-
viewable abuse. However, where an appellate court reverses for "abuse
of discretion," it too often appears merely to be substituting its own subjec-
tive determination of the manner in which a given debatable decision should
be resolved. Unlike other areas in which discretion may be reviewed, no
express guidelines have been established to govern the imposition of criminal
sentences. Judge Frankel optimistically suggests that appellate examination
of sentences will force reviewing courts to establish such guidelines; but
the cases that have thus far recognized appellate power to review sen-
tences have furnished no standards.17 Consequently, the substitution of the
judgment of a three-judge reviewing court probably would do no more than
establish mandatory sentencing councils on an appellate level. If appellate
judges are better equipped than trial judges to make the sentencing decision
-a highly debatable proposition-the concept of review is desirable. Other-
wise, only if sentencing standards are clearly articulated by the legislature
does appellate review make any sense.
While both sentencing councils and appellate review of sentences limit
the power of a single trial judge by authorizing participation in the sentenc-
ing decision by other members of the judiciary, such limitation may also be
accomplished by deferring the ultimate sentencing decision to an executive
agency. This self-imposed limitation, reflecting "a genuine distaste for the
grim responsibility of sentencing" (p. 87), allows the judge to impose an
indeterminate sentence and leave the actual term of incarceration up to the
parole board. While reformers extolled indeterminate sentencing in its early
stages of development,18 Judge Frankel has come to believe that the device
"has produced more cruelty and injustice than the benefits its supporters
envisage." (P. 88.)
The concept of indeterminate sentencing stems from recognition that "the
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime."'0 Since it is
16. Accord, ABA STANDARDS RELATING 'TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Ap-
proved draft 1968) ; Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Ex-
cessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671 (1962).
17. See authorities cited in note 15 supra.
18. See Note, The Indeterminate Sentence Laws-The Adolescence of Peno-Correc-
tional Legislation, 50 HARV. L. REV. 677, 686-87 (1937) ; cf. Hart, The Abis of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 407 (1958).
19. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). See also United States v.
Mitchell, 392 F.2d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Genet v. United States, 375 F.2d 960, 962
(10th Cir. 1967).
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entirely treatment-oriented, it serves the goal of rehabilitation to the virtual
exclusion of deterrence and retribution. The rehabilitative ideal, however,
rests on the unfounded assumption that all criminal offenders either need to
be, or can be, rehabilitated. But those to whom this assumption is inapplicable
run across the gamut of criminals. For example, there is a class of "normal
criminals, 20 epitomized by most white collar offenders, organized crime fig-
ures and, most particularly, corrupt politicians, who deliberately measure the
chance of being caught against the rewards of the crime and willingly accept
the risk. At the other extreme, there are those who are so severely disturbed
that no amount of existing treatment can effectively achieve their rehabilita-
tion. When indeterminate sentences are imposed upon offenders who are not
likely to benefit from rehabilitative efforts, parole boards have no available
standards for determining a suitable release date. With vaguely defined roles
and little guidance, parole boards are compelled to operate in a standardless
environment. 21 Since their decisions are generally given without either ex-
planation or uniformity, prisoners who are denied parole become increasingly
frustrated and hostile. As Judge Frankel observes, "The silence surrounding
parole-board decisions nurtures cynicism among the prisoners-a belief in
the arbitrariness and essential corruption of those in power. A pervasive sense
of helplessness generates frustration and rage." (P. 97.)
Given the inherent defects in the indeterminate sentencing doctrine, Judge
Frankel concludes that, except in those instances in which a concrete program
of rehabilitation can be fashioned, a definite, justifiable sentence should be
imposed based upon an "objective, equal and 'impersonal' evaluation of the
relevant qualities of both the criminal and the crime." (Pp. 101-02.) Admit-
tedly, these criteria merely define, rather than answer, the sentencing problem.
It is in the final and most important chapter that Judge Frankel proposes an
answer.
The kind of change that will ultimately promote fairness and consistency
in sentencing cannot be effected without appropriate legislative guidelines.
Recognizing this, judge Frankel proposes the enactment of a somewhat unique
statutory provision to define the accepted purposes of criminal penalties and
to require judges to identify the specific purposes relied upon in imposing a
particular sentence. This requirement would compel the judge to focus upon
the relationship of the purposes of punishment to the specific offender, pro-
mote consistency by reducing the broad range of factors that can properly
be relied upon, and facilitate intelligent scrutiny on appeal. By formulating
20. Judge Frankel borrows the term from F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE CRIM-
INAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 81-82 (1956).
21. Because parole boards operate "with no directions or means of achievement,"
Judge Frankel, although critical of the system in which they operate, defends the hard-
working United States parole officials against Professor Davis' allegation that "[t]he
performance of the Parole Board seems on the whole about as low in quality as any-
thing I have seen in the federal government." K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133 (1969).
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a set of acceptable sentencing purposes, the legislature could move toward a
rational classification of sentences. Judge Frankel expands these ideas into
a proposed codified sentencing matrix. A systematic and detailed rating of
the various elements that make up the sentencing decision would generate
a numerical profile for measuring the gravity of a particular sentence. While
Judge, Frankel recognizes that many sentencing factors are largely non-
quantifiable and that a "perfect" sentence cannot be reached by plugging one
independent variable into a set formula, a substantial degree of agreement
on concrete factors would promote rationality in the sentencing process.
To administer the disconnected and diverse aspects of the entire sentenc-
ing and corrections process, Judge Frankel proposes the creation of a "Com-
mission on Sentencing." (P. 118.) This commission would study improve-
ments to the system of sentencing and correction, formulate rules on the
basis of its studies, and enact those rules. Staffed by people of stature and
credibility, the commission would test its innovations on an experimental
basis in selected courts and serve as an ingrained "lobby" for beneficial
change. While the workings of his proposed commission are necessarily
sketchy in details, Judge Frankel is simply pleading for an instrumentality
of change in a process beset with problems and lacking in legal standards.
The scholarly views advanced by Judge Frankel have found immediate
citation in the courts. 22 Nonetheless, the nature of the appellate court as an
institution will most likely prevent the kind of activism that is necessary to
effect the changes that he envisions.-3 Consequently it is incumbent upon the
legislators and the citizens whom they represent to bear the cudgel born by
the eloquent ideas succinctly outlined in this book. Although scientific knowl-
edge has not yet yielded "objective" sentencing decisions, 24 Judge Frankel's
effort marks a giant stride toward fulfillment of that goal.
JAMIES R. THoMPSoN*
United States Attorney
Northern District of Illinois
GARY L. STARKMAN*
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Appellate Division "
Northern District of Illinois
22. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Manuella, 478 F2d 440, 442 (2d Cir. 1973); cf. United States v. Brown, 470
F2d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
23. But see United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1175-76 (2d Cir. 1973) (Fein-
berg, J., dissenting) (trial judge should sometimes be required to state reasons for
sentence imposed) ; United States v. McCord, 466 F.2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1972) (Feinberg,
J., dissenting) (appellate court should use supervisory powers to correct apparent sen-
tencing abuses).
24. See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 821, 825 (1968).
* The views expressed herein are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect
those of the United States Department of Justice.
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOVIET LAW. By James L. Hildebrand. Buffalo,
N.Y.: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1972. Pp. 227. $15.00.
What makes Soviet law unique? For decades Harold J. Berman of
Harvard University has been asserting that the key element of Soviet law is
an educational function that he calls "parentalism."' He has seized upon a
characteristic first enunciated but not so labelled by Karl Llewellyn in his
study of the Cheyenne Indians2 as the feature of prime importance in
assessing the public order system of the Soviet Union. The concept of
"parentalism" is so important to Berman that he has expressed impatience
with authors who disagree with him.3 But just what Berman means by
"parentalism" has seemed obscure to at least one critic who thought that some
of the features Berman identifies as parental are more likely the extension of
pre-revolutionary Russian legal procedures than the contribution of socialism.4
Berman has an enthusiastic disciple in James L. Hildebrand. Approaching
the subject from a sociological viewpoint, Hildebrand is enamored by the
parental concept. His book is a brief written in support of Berman's idea.
Hildebrand defines parentalism to mean that judges, whether in the formal
general courts or the informal comrades' courts, have their eyes focused
primarily on the general public, both in the courtroom and beyond, and not
on the accused before them. Consequently, the severity of their sentence is
based not only upon factors involving the citizen standing before them, but
also on the lesson they want to teach the general public. "Justice" is not,
therefore, tailored to the deviant alone, but to what the Communist Party's
policy makers wish to instill in the mind of the public as a code of morals
suitable to the Party's needs.
This argument leads Hildebrand to a point that he finds crucial to discern-
ing the novelty in the Soviet public order system: law does not conform to
the crowd's values, it leads the crowd in the direction plotted by a small elite.
Law is not following; it is leading. Hildebrand is right in this conclusion to
a degree, for Soviet law has a leadership function more sharply pronounced
than in non-communist systems. The task of Soviet law is to remold society
so that a new Soviet man will emerge. The legal system is not to enforce a
public order system fashioned by the masses for themselves.
But Hildebrand does more than support a thesis; he hypothesizes what
results are to be expected from the emphasis upon parentalism and concludes
that the end will not be what the policy makers profess as their goal. There
will be no "withering away" of legal coercion, as Marx and Engels had
1. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA: AN INTERPRETATION OF SovImT LAW 3-4, 199-291
(1950).
2. K. LLEWELLYN AND E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941).
3. Berman, What Makes "Socialist Law" Socialist?, 20 PROBLEMS OF CoanduNism
24, 30. (No. 5, Sept.-Oct., 1971).
4. Timasheff, Is Soviet Law a Challenge to American Law?, 19 FORDHA-m L. REV.
182, 188-89 (1950).
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predicted, because a legal system that emphasizes education cannot create the
basis for evolution of such a phenomenon. On the contrary, Hildebrand
believes that as a new morality is inculcated, an educational bias will lead away
from a rule of law principle. Without devotion to the rule of law, citizens will
never achieve a self-centered system of social control capable of succeeding the
contemporary state-centered system of coercion. Hildebrand believes that the
post-Stalin emphasis upon development of societal controls-characterized by
a voluntary militia to supplement the work of the professional police -and an
informal comrades' court system to supplement the work of the general
courts--cannot but lead to reverence for ad hoc decisions. These controls do
not, he says, "educate." Education can flow only from adherence to general
rules of law, embodied in published decisions that create a predictable pattern
that can guide would-be deviants. Without predictability, the citizen will
adhere to no norms and consequently, will never be "educated" by the law.
Is Hildebrand's thesis sound? I recall the criticism of Soviet teachers
while I was an exchange student in Moscow decades ago. I, too, was im-
pressed by the educational function of Soviet law and tended to emphasize
it as of first concern in considering Soviet law's uniqueness. But my Soviet
critics, while admitting that education was a component of Soviet law, placed
it last, not first, in the hierarchy of goals. They argued that education serves
no purpose unless the citizenry is first placed in an economic and political
situation that has prepared the ground for new seed. Only after revolution
and reconstruction can education be effective. Law must first smash the
bourgeoisie by expropriating their property; then it must create a social and
economic structure that will facilitate production and provide abundance.
Finally, law will educate those who fail to see the advantages of the new
system so that they can wholeheartedly support it.
But even assuming, with Hildebrand, that education is in a primary
position, one must quarrel with his reading of the evidence. He sees the
educational function as being performed primarily by comrades' courts;
however, these courts have been given far less emphasis since Nikita Khru-
shchev's ouster in 1964. The general courts are the current focus of concern.
Furthermore, judges in the general courts do consider the "whole man" in
determining sentences; they try to devise punishments that concern him
individually. To be sure, his colleagues and those who know about his case
will be educated, often through the demonstration trials in public places which
Hildebrand finds educational of the masses, but this educational function is
5. In this series of steps law will nationalize means of production; then it will
provide the legal foundation for Communist Party monopoly leadership-the elite
presumed to know desirable directions because of their study of Marxism-and the
state structure necessary to administer the great fund of state owned property. Law
will provide for popular participation in the making of operating (not policy) decisions,
and exclude even from that function those presumed to be hostile because of, their social
origin, namely those who are not workers or peasants. Thereafter, law will have a
"mopping up" function in educating those peasants and workers who remain recalcitrant.
(Vol, 74.
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secondary in the court's consideration. Of major concern is the accused; the
punishment is designed for him. Admittedly, there is a fine line between
education of the individual and those who follow the proceedings, but there
is a difference in degree, and it is critical. Also, there is an increasing emphasis
upon conformity to procedural rules (with the exception of some politically
oriented trials). This turn toward adherence to a rule of law might have been
considered by Hildebrand as a step toward achieving a condition likely to lead
to a "withering away" of law, contrary to his conclusion of the unlikelihood
of that result.
This type of evidence weakens Hildebrand's thesis, both as to the pre-
dominance of the general educational role of law and as to its dysfunctional
character. Of course, the tide may turn, as it has often in the fifty-five year
history of Soviet law, but as of this moment, there is no indication of a turn
back to Khrushchev's emphasis upon informal tribunals and ad hoc decisions.
This aspect of the Soviet public order system has definitely been placed in a
secondary position.
Finally, reference must be made to Hildebrand's discussion of the grow-
ing use of sociological techniques to study Soviet society and the role of law.
He correctly recognizes the new interest in sociology since Stalin's death. For
instance, Soviet lawyers now reject the thesis that crime is the result of the
relics of capitalism and have begun to study social conditions; they are asking
why crime persists in Soviet society. Hildebrand also recognizes that these
studies still overlook participatory interaction between citizens and their legal
institutions. In contemporary verbiage, they fail to investigate "feed-back."
Nevertheless, I wish that Hildebrand had analyzed some of these studies in
some detail. 6
The Sociology of Soviet Law has value as a resume of Harold J. Ber-
man's work on "parentalism, ' '7 as a discussion of the dysfunctional nature of
the informal comrades' courts and voluntary militia, and also as an attempt
to apply the methods of the sociologist to examine the goals and achievements
of Soviet lawyers. The book does not, however, pretend to be a general
introduction to Soviet law. Within the limits set by the author, he has
provoked thought from a discipline that has given little attention to this
subject. Would that more sociologists actually investigate Soviet law, and not
content themselves with saying that it is beyond investigation because of
inadequate empirical data and the impossibility of gathering such data through
field research within the Soviet Union itself.
JOHN N. HAZARD
Professor of Public Law
Columbia University
6. For such an analysis, see W. CONNOR, DEVIANCE IN SOVIET SOCIETY: CRIME,
DELINQUENCY AND ALCOHOLISM (1972).
7. The book contains long quotations from Berman's studies.
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